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RECENT CASES
ESCHEAT - DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY ESCHEATED - SITUS OF INTANGIBLES -
New Jersey statutes provide for the escheat of personal property to the state
whenever the owner or the whereabouts of the owner shall remain unknown
for a period of fourteen successive years.' Under this act the state petitioned
for a decree escheating unpaid dividends and twelve shares of stock to the
state of New Jersey. The state court ordered., the escheat. On appeal, the
appellant contended that the judgment deprived it of property without due
process of law since claimants had no opportunity to learn of the escheat
proceeding; the obligation of contract rights of the owners of the escheated
property was impaired in violation of the United States Constitution; 2 and the
situs of the shares and the dividends was not in New Jersey for escheat
purposes. The United States Supreme Court held, that the notice by publi-
cation in compliance with the statutes was adequate. The Court found no
impairment of contract, but only the exercise of a regulatory power over
abandoned property. The Court stated that the situs of an intangible is
fictional, and in order to dispose of the rights of the parties to the intangible,
it is only necessary to have control over the parties. Standard Oil Co. v. State
of New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
In a similar action it was decided that unclaimed shares and dividends of
a domestic corporation which had been dissolved could be held in a school
fund until the owner appeared.3 On the other hand it was held that stock
certificates deposited in a Michigan bank escheated to the state of Michigan
even though the owner lived in California. 4 In contrast a Washington court
determined that bank deposits in that state would not escheat to the state of
Washington since the situs of movable property is at the domicile of the owner. 5
Many courts have decided that the situs of corporate stock is at the state of
incorporation. 6 Various reasons have been given such as the property repre-
sented by the certificate is held in the state in hich the company assumed its
corporate form.7 Stock certificates are only the evidence of ownership in the
eyes of many courts. 8 Additional reasons given for such a conclusion include
that the certificate of stock can be enforced only where the corporation is,9
and the corporation is subject to duties, obligations, etc. to the state whose
creature it is.'° Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act it has been held that
1. N.J. Rev. Stat. §2:53-17, N.J.S.A. (1937).
2. U.S. Const. Art. I, §10.
3. In re Hull Cooper Co., 46 Ariz. 270, 50 P.2d 560 (1935) (the court appeared
reluctant to find an outright escheat), 45 Yale L.J. 720 (1936).
4. In re Rapoport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N.W.2d 777 (1946) (escheat statute
overruled prior court rule that the situs of intangibles is situs of owner).
5. In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933).
6. Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Lilienfield's Estate, 132 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1943);
South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 11 S.W. 348 (1889) (situs fixed
by statute).
7. Jellenik v. Huron Cooper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1900); LeRoy Sargent & Co. v.
McHarg, 42 S.D. 307, 174 N.W. 742 (1919) (concerned stock voting rights); Gamble
v. Dawson, 67 Wash. 72, 120 Pac. 1060 (1912).
8. See, e.g., Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900); Gamble v.
Dawson, 67 Wash. 72, 120 Pac. 1060 (1912).
9. Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 66 Pac. 971 (1901).
10. Ewing v. Warren, 144 Miss. 233, 109 So. 601 (1926) (involved devolution of
shares) (but also held that shares in a Louisiana corporation were governed by Mississippi
law), 40 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1927). For fence straddling decisions which conclude that
personal property may have a status different from that of the domicile of the owner,
and that while the situs of stock certificates may be in the state of incorporation, the
situs may be elsewhere for some purposes, see Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F.2d 355,358
(2d Cir. 1926), 26 Mich. L. Rev. 101 (1927); Lohman v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.,
326 Mo. 819, 33 S.W.2d 112 (1930).
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the state in which the certificates are located is the situs for transfer and
attachment or levy." t The United States Supreme Court has held that the
ownership of stock certificates depends upon the law of the place where they
are located.12
In the decade between 1930 and 1940 numerous articles were written on
the problem of the situs of stock."- While recognizing the conflict, the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws takes the view that the share is under the
jurisdiction of the state of incorporation; the certificate is subject to the
state where it is located; and if the state of incorporation merges the share
and the certificate, in that event the state having jurisdiction over the certificate
has jurisdiction over the share. 14 After a history of inconsistency, the United
States Supreme Court reverted to its original position 15 that intangibles might
be taxed in the state of domicile and in the state where evidences of ownership
are located 16 on the theory that the owner received protection and benefits
from the laws of both states. In 1942 the Court held that a state of incorpora-
tion could tax shares of stock even though they had been taxed elsewhere."7
It is conceded that the analogy between escheat and taxation of stock certifi-
cates is not complete since there can only be one escheat in one jurisdiction
while several jurisdictions may tax an intangible. However, justices, including
those in the instant case, in seeking a precedent will cite cases involving other
types of action to determine a situs for shares of stock.
Since North Dakota has adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act for
attachment or levy on shares, 18 the certificates of stock must be seized.1 9
Under this act the modem tendency is to hold that the situs of shares rep-
resented by the certifcates issued under the Act is that of the physical location
of the certificates. 20 The modern view identifies the share of stock with the
stock certificate and treats the certificate as representing the property right.2 1
The existing characteristics of an intangible under new statutes should be
given consideration rather than procedents established under prior statutes. 22
There are several states where intangibles might escheat such as the state
of incorporation; domicile of the last known owner; true residence of owner;
last known domicile of owner; and main place of business of obligor.2- Treating
the stock certificate as tangible property which was done in Cummings v.
11. Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939).
12. Disconto-Gesellsehaft v. U.S. Steel Co. 267 U.S. 22 (1925); DeGanay v.
Lederer, 250 U.S. 376 (1919).
1. Hine, Situs of Shares Issued Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 87 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 700 (1939); 19 Va. L. Rev. 386 (1933); 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 522 (1937);
23 Minn L. Rev. 381 (1939); Pomerance, The 'Situs" of Stock, 17 Corn. L. Q. 43 (1931).
14. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §53 (1934).
15. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
16. Curry v. McCanles, 307 U.S. 357 (1939). Compare First National Bank v. Maine,
284 U.S. 312 (1832), with Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920),
and Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930), with Blodgett v. Silberman,
277 U.S. 1 (1928).
17. State Tax Comm'n. v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
18. N.D. Rev. Code c. 10-18 (1943).
19. N.D. Rev. Code §10-1813 (1943).
20. Hine, Situs of Shares Issued Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 87 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 700 (1939); 19 Va. L. Rev. 386 (1933).
21. 26 Mich L. Rev. 101 (1927).
22. Hine, Situ of Shares Issued Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 87 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 700 (1939).
23. See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 445 (1951).
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Clark "' - would appear to be the simple solution since laymen look upon the
certificate as property. The argument that the share is located in the state
of incorporation fails to take into account that frequently little if any corporate
property is actually located in that state.
North Dakota has the usual escheat statutes.- 5 Statutes also state that the
state owns all property which has no owner.2 6 The state under the escheat
laws acquires property by reversion and not by succession.2 7 In addition the
state has an unusual statute prohibiting farming by corporations2  and
providing for an escheat of such farm land in the event the corporation fails
to dispose of it. - 9 If the problem should arise in North Dakota, the courts
might do well to hold contra to the instant case and provide for the escheat
in the jurisdiction in which the certificates are located. It would seem wise
to avoid the legal gobbledygook which has developed around the concept
of the intangibility of stock certificates and treat the certificates as the property
with a location of its own. This would tend to recognize the practice of most
people including lawyers, outside the court room, of dealing with the certificates
as property since they can be disposed of for money. In the present tax-
minded era, however, no doubt the courts would follow the decision of the
instant case should the case of first impression be one in which the stock
certificates of a domestic corporation were located elsewhere.
VELOYcE G. WINSLOW
PROPERTY - EMINENT DOMAIN - SURROUNDING OF CEMETERY BY AmPORTr
NOT A TARING. - The defendant city acquired by eminent domain all of the
land surrounding a cemetery for a municipal airport. The cemetery corpora-
tion, contending that a taking had occurred, brought an action of mandamus
to compel the city to condemn the cemetery and compensate the corporation.
The lower court dismissed the petition. On appeal it was held, that the
damages were only consequential and that a taking had not occurred. A dis-
senting opinion expressed the view a taking had occurred. On motion for
clarification of the opinion ,the court decided per curiam that the basic issue
was whether mandamus would lie, and answered in the negative. Friendship
Cemetery of Ann Arundel County v. City of Baltimore, 81 A.2d 57 (Md. 1951).
Legal problems arising from the operation of aircraft have increased
proportionately with the increase in the number of airports which have sprung
up to accomodate the expansion of flying. Closely connected with the
establishment of municipal airports under eminent domain proceedings is
the vexing question of what constitutes a taking of property. Thus, though
the court eventually decided the case on other grounds, the present decision
presents a problem of considerable importance.
"Taking," under an early view,' was effected only when there was an
24. 282 Fed. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1922), aff'd., 2 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1924).
25. N.D.;,Rev. Code §§56-0114, 54-0102 (1943).
26. N.D. Rev. Code §§47-0110, 54-0102 (1943).
27. Delaney v. State, 42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290 (1919).
28. N.D. Rev. Code §10-0601 (1943).
29. N.D. Rev. Code §10-0606 (1943); Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207
(1945) (constitutionality upheld).
1. See Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad Co., 6 Whart. 25, 46 (1840).
